INTRODUCTION
It is when a clash of policies between two states emerges that the need of the Clause is the greatest. 1 In 2000, Heather Finstuen became a legal mother of two girls after adopting the biological daughters of her partner in New Jersey. 2 The family moved to Oklahoma soon after the adoption. 3 Beginning in 2004, however, Finstuen began to avoid signing her daughters' permission slips for school field trips, gymnastics, and Girl Scout camp. 4 She stopped signing school enrollment forms and health release forms, even when one daughter had surgery. 5 She and her partner, Anne Magro, feared that Finstuen would be unable to visit her daughters if one was admitted to intensive care, or be unable to sign forms in an emergency should Magro be unavailable. 6 The family's concern arose from a 2004 amendment to Oklahoma's adoption code that prohibited any state official, agency, or court from recognizing an out-of-state adoption by a same-sex couple. 7 To Oklahoma officials, these out-of-state parent-child relationships did not exist. 8 Pursuant to the amendment, state officials began refusing to issue revised birth certificates for the children of same-sex couples who presented out-ofstate adoption decrees. 9 Without these birth certificates, same-sex couples were unable to prove their parent-child relationships. 10 Once an obscure provision termed the -lawyer's clause‖ of the Constitution, 11 the Full Faith and Credit Clause is now at the center of a nationwide debate involving parents, children, adoption, and same-sex marriage. 12 Circuit courts have split regarding the force and scope of the Clause. In Finstuen v. Crutcher, 13 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the Oklahoma adoption code amendment violated the Clause by categorically prohibiting recognition of out-of-state adoption decrees held by same-sex couples. 14 In so holding, the Tenth Circuit allowed the plaintiffs to bring a federal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the deprivation of constitutional rights by a state executive official. 15 Five years later, in Adar v. Smith, 16 the Fifth Circuit held that a Louisiana policy of denying revised birth certificates to same-sex out-of-state couples did not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 17 The Fifth Circuit also held that the Clause governed only state courts, rather than state officials, and that plaintiffs had no federal cause of action under § 1983 for alleged violations of the Clause. 18 This circuit split reflects the current climate in the United States of -volatile uncertainty regarding the portability of parental rights acquired by same-sex or unmarried couples and other alternative families from state to state.‖ 19 This Note explains the legal conflict surrounding a state's obligation under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize out-of-state adoption judgments held by certain groups or individuals, and whether that obligation confers an individual right enforceable under § 1983. Part I of this Note explores the command of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the policies and law underlying American adoption practice, and the protection of constitutional rights under § 1983. Part II analyzes the split among courts over whether out-of-state adoptive couples are entitled to receive revised birth certificates recognizing their status as legal parents in their child's birth state, when the couple would be unable to adopt in that state. In Part III, this Note proposes a framework of -meaningful recognition‖ to describe the Clause's mandate concerning judicially established rights. It asserts that this obligation binds both state judicial and executive officers. The Note concludes that the denial of revised birth certificates to out-ofstate adoptive couples violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause's command to meaningfully recognize and equally enforce out-of-state judgments.
I. BACKGROUND: THE LEGAL ISSUES
This Note first explores the three legal fields that have converged in the current circuit split. Part I.A explains how the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires states to recognize-to varying degrees-legal rights and obligations created in sister states. Part I.B describes state adoption practice with a focus on same-sex couples' access to adoption. Part I.C considers the vindication of constitutional rights under § 1983.
A. The Full Faith and Credit Command: The Clause, Its History and Purpose
This section examines how the knotty doctrine of full faith and credit regulates interstate relations and protects rights and obligations that travel across state lines. Part I.A.1 introduces the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the fundamental issues surrounding its application. Part I.A.2 details the development of the full faith and credit doctrine, as advanced by the U.S. Supreme Court. After explaining the principles animating the Clause in Part I.A.3, Part I.A. 4 shows how the Clause's underlying principles determine the different credit due to state records, laws, and judgments. Part I.A.5 concludes by describing Supreme Court precedent that has addressed the scope of the Clause.
Primer on a Problematic Clause
Article IV, Section 1, of the Constitution commands that -Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.‖ 20 At its core, the Full Faith and Credit Clause addresses what a state should do when presented with a sister-state law or judgment. In doing so, it -serves to coordinate the administration of justice among the several independent legal systems which exist in our (1998) . For clarity, this Note will refer to the first sentence as the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and to the second sentence as the Effects Clause.
21. See Jackson, supra note 11, at 2.
It is uncontested that the terms -faith‖ and -credit‖ derive from the English law of evidence 22 and that the doctrine generally developed from the law of nations. 23 It is also clear that the Clause does not mean that one state's judgment holds the same force in a second state as a judgment rendered by that second state. 24 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that literal enforcement of the Clause can lead to -absurd‖ results. 25 Thus, despite its modifier -full,‖ the Full Faith and Credit Clause is neither -inexorable [nor] unqualified‖ in its application to records, statutes, and judgments. 26 Scholars have asserted that -murky‖ 27 origins and a -hazy‖ 28 understanding of this constitutional clause have contributed to its problematic interpretation.
A fundamental uncertainty has been how to weigh the full faith and credit due to the various sister-state activities listed in the Clause. Since the Clause's enactment, scholars have debated whether it provides for a narrow, evidentiary effect, or a broader, preclusive effect. 29 Under the narrow evidentiary approach, out-of-state enactments would be given effect only insofar as a court must accept them as proof that another state's statutes and judgments exist and -deal with the matters described in their text.‖ 30 Their content could then be impeached or challenged. 31 Interpreting the Full Faith and Credit Clause to contain a broader provision would demand that states give substantive effect to sister-state laws and judgments. 32 For example, a judgment's merits-not just its existence-would be given conclusive effect so as to preclude a second state from examining the same issues of the judgment. 33 This approach would oblige states to recognize the rights and obligations created by a 22 sister-state's judgment. 34 Such a firm mandate would also, in theory, require states to substitute another state's statutory or common law for their own when the two laws conflict. 35 And yet, such a requirement would be, in the Supreme Court's language, -absurd.‖ 36 Defining the substantive effect entitled to a sister-state's laws complicated the Clause's earliest interpretation. 37 A group of scholars has recently asserted that the modern full faith and credit doctrine has significantly diverged from what the Framers intended. 38 The sections below provide further detail on the administration of full faith and credit.
Origins and Interpretation
This section discusses the origins of the full faith and credit doctrine and the judicial development of the American approach to full faith and credit. It considers how the same command came to require different levels of credit for laws and judgments. This section also explains how both the absence of codified choice-of-law rules to address conflicting state laws, 39 and the addition of a federal full faith and credit implementing statute, 40 led to initial uncertainty over the extent of a state's obligation under the Clause to give effect to out-of-state laws and judgments.
a. The Law of Nations and English Full Faith and Credit
The full faith and credit doctrine speaks to situations in which a state is presented with a -foreign‖ (out-of-state) law or judgment. The doctrine has its origins in principles of the law of nations. 41 Generally, the laws of one 34 . See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998 nation are not binding in the territory of another nation; thus, any effect given to foreign laws and judgments is a gesture of comity. 42 Accordingly, nations treat foreign judgments only as prima facie evidence of the underlying claim, the merits of which could be reexamined by the second nation. 43 Scholars agree that the Constitution's phrase -full faith and credit‖ derives from the English law of evidence. 44 The term's usage by English courts, however, was -ambiguous‖ 45 or, more positively, -highly flexible.‖ 46 To accord full faith and credit could mean authenticating an affidavit, 47 deeming a record trustworthy, 48 or giving prior proceedings preclusive effect. 49 Significantly, English courts treated prior domestic records and foreign records differently. 50 By the eighteenth century, foreign judgments were given only evidentiary credit, while domestic judgments from different courts could be entitled to substantive credit depending on the type or authority of the rendering court. 51
b. From Colonial Clauses to Constitution
For the colonies, the two-fold English treatment raised the question of whether sister-colony judgments should be treated as foreign or domestic. 52 Eighteenth century colonial laws varied between granting evidentiary or substantive effect to neighboring colonies' judgments or records. 53 Thus, the drafters of the Articles of Confederation in 1777 faced a diversity of approaches to full faith and credit. 54 differs from the law-of-nations approach. The law of nations is a set of natural law rules that governs peacetime relations among nations, and addresses traditionally domestic legal issues such as contract, property, tort, and crime. The Articles of Confederation contained a full faith and credit clause identical to that in the Constitution but did not contain an Effects Clause. 55 The five reported cases decided under the Articles' full faith and credit provision suggest an evidentiary approach but do not constitute conclusive evidence about how early courts understood the force of full faith and credit. 56 The cases indicate that courts were concerned about defining what, if any, substantive effect was entitled to sister-state judgments and laws. 57 The Constitutional Convention of 1787 retained the Articles' full faith and credit command but added the Effects Clause 58 in response to objections that -if the Legislature were not allowed to declare the effect the provision would amount to nothing more than what now takes place among all Independent Nations.‖ 59 The Effects Clause allows Congress to provide the manner of authentication and declare the effect of state public acts, records, and judicial proceedings. 60 The draft text, however, granted discretion to the states on whether to accord faith and credit, and mandated the federal government to prescribe the interstate effects of judgments. 61 The Convention eventually adopted James Madison's suggestion to switch the verbs -ought‖ and -shall‖ so that the Clause's charge was binding on states and the power to promulgate effects of the Clause was within Congress's discretion. 62 67. The Act's language varies from the Clause's text in several ways. First, the Act is silent as to the interstate effect of laws (public acts). Second, whereas the Clause mandates that full faith and credit be given -in each State,‖ the Act limits its prescribed effect to courts. Third, the Act also limits its scope to judicial records. Fourth, the Act extends the faith and credit language, judges interpreting the Act were required to address whether Congress was importing the Clause's command or dictating a different effect. 68 As with the faith and credit provision in the Articles of Confederation, the lower court decisions included both evidentiary and substantive interpretations of the term -full faith and credit.‖ 69 A second implementing statute, enacted in 1804 to cover executive records, 70 did little to resolve the uncertainty. 71 Eventually, the Supreme Court addressed the divergent interpretations in its first full faith and credit case in 1813.
d. The Supreme Court Resolves Credit Owed to Judgments
In Mills v. Duryee, 72 the Supreme Court ruled that the Full Faith and Credit Act prescribed a substantive effect for records and judgments so as to preclude the reexamination of merits. 73 Mills concerned an action of debt brought in the District of Columbia on a New York judgment, and addressed the question whether the defendant could enter a plea denying the existence of the debt. 74 The Supreme Court, therefore, had to resolve whether the prior New York judgment should be introduced into the D.C. court as merely rebuttable evidence of debt, or given substantive effect. 75 Writing for the majority, Justice Joseph Story explained that interpreting the Act to contain a mere evidentiary rule would render the constitutional Clause -illusory.‖ 76 Mills clarified that the judgment of a state court must have the same -credit, validity and effect‖ in other states as it had in the faith and credit obligation to all courts, thus including federal courts. Fifth, though using the Clause's phrase -faith and credit,‖ the Act does not specify -full faith and credit‖ but employs the comparative expression -such faith and credit . . . as‖ the record or judgment had where rendered. The current statute, as amended in 1948, requires full faith and credit to sister-state statutes, and expands its coverage to federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006) (-Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.‖).
68. See Engdahl, supra note 38, at 1588, 1640-47 (surveying cases and arguing that the Clause contained an evidentiary sufficiency rule and the Act prescribed substantive effect); Whitten, supra note 20, at 296-327 (analyzing cases and concluding that a -clear majority‖ of judges rejected a broad reading of both the Clause and Act 79 Nevertheless, by the end of the nineteenth century, the effect given to sister-state judgments was attributed to both the Clause and Act without regard to the provisions' differing language. 80 suggested that a state would not have to apply sister-state law that it found -obnoxious to its policy.‖ 88 Having discarded this balancing approach, the Supreme Court's application of full faith and credit now allows a state to choose its own law as long as it -ha[s] a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.‖ 89 In this way, the evolving application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to statutes has merged with the Due Process Clause to impose a minimal constitutional limit on a state's choice of law in its courts. 90 
Purpose and Principles
The Full Faith and Credit Clause is an essential tool for welding the states into a unified and integrated country. 91 The Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that the Clause's animating purpose was -to alter the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and to make them integral parts of a single nation.‖ 92 To achieve the change from foreign sovereigns to united states, the Framers -substituted [the Clause's] command for the earlier principles of comity.‖ 93 As a result, the Full Faith and Credit Clause prevents states from discriminating against other states and refusing to enforce validly created rights and obligations. 94 When the Clause restricts one state's authority, however, it concurrently promotes state sovereignty by preserving the policies encompassed in 88 another state's judicial determination, law, or record. 95 The Supreme Court has observed that the Clause prevents -parochial entrenchment on the interests of other States‖ that would occur if the rendering state could dictate an external effect other than full faith and credit. 96 The Clause promotes interstate compromise by allowing a state to determine the extraterritorial effects of its laws, but only -indirectly, by prescribing the effect of its judgments within‖ its own territory. 97 In addition to balancing state interests in securing and defending policies, the Full Faith and Credit Clause obliges states to respect judicial finality. 98 The Clause limits a state legislature's ability to undermine the enforcement of obligations created by sister-state judiciaries. 99 Similarly, the Clause prohibits state executive officers from substituting their judgment for the policies underlying a sister-state's judicial determination. 100 Though the Full Faith and Credit Clause allows state legislatures to direct the enforcement of rights and obligations resulting from out-of-state judgments, the Clause ensures that states treat the judgments with equal dignity, regardless of the conflicting policies. 101 The Supreme Court has also articulated that the Clause benefits individual litigants by preserving their rights acquired or confirmed under a state's validly created law or judgment. 102 The Clause advances the -maximum enforcement‖ of state obligations or rights in sister-states. 103 95. See Jackson, supra note 11, at 34 (asserting that the Clause promotes a system of justice -based on the preservation but better integration‖ of state jurisdictions); Mark D. By preserving the finality of judgments, the Clause protects individual liberty and allows individuals to travel through states with the security that judicially created rights enjoy -nation-wide application.‖ 104 Moreover, a state's full faith and credit duty promotes finality and certainty for individuals by preventing dissatisfied litigants from relitigating issues that have already been decided in another state. 105 The Clause protects parties from the -uncertainty, confusion, and delay‖ that accompany such reexamination. 106 In sum, the Full Faith and Credit Clause carefully balances four competing interests: (1) the interest of federalism in state compromise; (2) dual state interests in promoting state policies and defending against the intrusion of other state's policies; (3) the interest of separation of powers in preserving judgments; and (4) the interests of individuals in liberty and security. 107 The different credit due to sister-state laws or judgments reflects the Clause's cautious balance. 108 Scholars debate when the Clause may recognize that a single state's interest in preserving its own policiesand declining the policies encompassed by an out-of-state judgment-is outweighed by the competing federal, state, and individual interests. 109 In such cases, the Clause may -order submission by one State even to hostile policies reflected in the judgment of another State, because the practical operation of the federal system . . . demand[s] it.‖ 110 Thus, a state's full faith and credit obligation is the -price‖ of a unified federal system. 111 
Modern Doctrine: How to Measure Full Faith and Credit
In effecting the principles discussed above, contemporary Supreme Court decisions have clarified that the demand of full faith and credit adjusts depending on the type of law rendered. Building on the history and principles outlined above, this section details the modern doctrine of full faith and credit. 
a. Records and Routine Admission
Case law and commentary are sparse on the full faith and credit doctrine's application to records. 112 -Records‖ in the Clause refer to nonjudicial records. 113 The two implementing statutes provide simple procedures for authenticating records for admission into evidence, 114 which courts have followed without controversy. 115 The -records‖ provisions of the Clause and its companion acts have not been applied beyond this effect. 116 Generally, to give full faith and credit to sister-state records means to -admit them routinely‖ into evidence in court. 117 
b. Public Acts and the Public Policy Exception
A state's compliance with the full faith and credit command when asked to apply another state's -public acts‖ is more complex. 118 It is well established that a state's statutes constitute -public acts‖ under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 119 For choice-of-law purposes, the Supreme Court has articulated that the Clause operates along with the Due Process Clause to impose a minimal constitutional limit on a forum state's authority to apply its own law in a dispute between diverse parties. 120 With an accommodating standard, 121 the Clause does not require -a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.‖ 122 Although by the 1950s the Supreme Court had abandoned the notion that a court should weigh conflicting state interests, 123 it has reiterated that a court may be -guided by the forum State's ‗public policy' in determining the law applicable to a controversy.‖ 124 
c. Judgments and the Distinction Between Recognition and Enforcement
The full faith and credit command is most demanding with respect to judicial proceedings. 126 In contrast to the accommodating statutory approach, an -exacting‖ obligation denies states any discretion in choosing to recognize sister-state judgments. 127 Simply put, there is -no roving ‗public policy exception'‖ that might permit states to ignore another state's judgment. 128 Through the Full Faith and Credit Clause, -rights judicially established in any part are given nation-wide application.‖ 129 Accordingly, sister-state judgments are entitled to nationwide force -for claim and issue preclusion (res judicata) purposes.‖ 130 To qualify for this fullest treatment, a judgment must be final, 131 and rendered by a court with 125 . See Franchise Tax Bd., 538 U.S. at 499 (quoting Carroll, 349 U.S. at 413) (-States' sovereignty interests are not foreign to the full faith and credit command. But we are not presented here with a case in which a State has exhibited a ‗policy of hostility to the public Acts' of a sister State.‖). Some scholars assert that, though the public policy allowance was part of the law-of-nations approach to conflict of laws, the Clause was intended to eliminate the exception. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L. J. 1965, 1971-72, 1985-86 (1997) (arguing that the public policy exception was -a matter of customary international law‖ and had been -incorporated into American practice with no particular thought given to its appropriateness in the context of a federal system defined by a written constitution,‖ but that -[t]he central object of the Clause was . . . to eliminate a state's prideful unwillingness to recognize other states' laws or judgments on the ground that these are inferior or unacceptable‖); Laycock, supra note 29, at 313 (-The public-policy exception is a relic carried over from international law without reflection on the changes in interstate relations wrought by the Constitution.‖).
126 144 In Thompson, a father brought suit in federal court against his ex-wife, and sought an order declaring the validity of a Louisiana order that had granted him custody of their child, while invalidating a California custody order in favor of his wife. 145 The plaintiff did not allege a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause because he had not challenged the California order in state court prior to initiating the case in federal court. 146 Instead, he based the action against his wife on a full faith and credit provision in the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act 147 (PKPA).
The Thompson court ruled that the PKPA's full faith and credit reference did not provide an implied private cause of action in federal court to determine which of two conflicting custody orders should prevail. 148 In the Court's words, the purpose of the PKPA was to increase a state court's full faith and credit obligation owed to custody orders, whose status as -final judgments‖ was in doubt because they were modifiable. 149 The Supreme Court found that Congress intended the PKPA to have the -same operative effect‖ as the Full Faith and Credit Act. 150 The Court reasoned that the PKPA was -most naturally construed‖ as a -mandate directed to state courts‖ and therefore, did not -create an entirely new cause of action‖ beyond challenging a state court's denial of full faith and credit. 151 In its analysis, the Thompson court observed that -the Full Faith and Credit Clause, in either its constitutional or statutory incarnations, does not give rise to an implied federal cause of action.‖ 152 The Court, citing 1904's Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., noted that the Clause -only prescribes a rule by which courts, Federal and state, are to be guided‖ when deciding the effect and applicability of sister-state laws or statutes. 153 Expressing concern that federal review to enjoin a state custody order would require inquiry into states' substantive domestic relationship he heart of the adoption transaction became the judicially monitored transfer of rights‖). A child's -best interests‖ were defined more in economic than in psychological terms well into the twentieth century. See 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 1.03 [2] . Beginning in the 1930s, the modern view of adoption emerged, characterized by concern for the social and psychological well-being of the child. See id. § 1.04. adoption in America. 161 Adoption was viewed as a contract between adults to address concerns of inheritance and the continuity of the adopter's family. 162 The shift in American adoption law, from private contracts to public statutes requiring judicial approval, reflected a realization -of what is accomplished in the legal act of adopting‖-the endowment to the adopted child of rights equal to that of a natural child. 163 The magnitude of this result necessitated state involvement to protect the child. 164 The modern approach therefore incorporated an -expanded [judicial] authority to employ . . . discretion‖ that already existed for the resolution of custody disputes. 165 In sum, -the public sector triumphed over the private‖ in American adoption policy. 166 Although an agency or individuals may now -arrange‖ an adoption, 167 the legal relationship of parent and child cannot be created without a judicial decree. 168 A court must determine a biological parent's consent (or waiver) and a child's -best interests‖ before any legal rights or obligations transfer. 169 Despite a common standard of -best interests,‖ however, state adoption statutes rarely define the term with specificity. 170 Though most adoption proceedings are non-adversarial, 186 states generally require that a petitioner file a pleading 187 and give notice to interested parties, 188 and that a court hold a hearing 189 and issue a judicial finding approving the adoption. 190 When a natural parent contests an adoption, the procedural requirements are more stringent. 191 Similarly, where the termination of the natural parents' rights, if required, 192 occurs prior to or as a consequence of an adoption judgment, the judicial proceedings may be more vigorous. 193 Reflecting a growing trend among states, the Uniform Adoption Act 194 (UAA) requires an evaluation of the prospective parents for all adoptions, whether placements by individuals or agencies, that may then be submitted to the court. 195 Finally, even where uncontested, adoptions entail judicial scrutiny and are not automatically approved. 196 
State and Federal Laws Addressing Access to Adoption for Gays and Lesbians
One way in which state statutes control access to adoption is by specifying certain means to create legal parentage. For example, in a joint or dual petition adoption, both birth parents relinquish their parental rights, allowing a married couple to jointly assume legal parentage. 197 In a stepparent adoption, the most common in the United States, 198 a child is adopted by her custodial biological parent's new spouse. 199 A secondparent adoption allows an adult who is not related to a child through biology or marriage to become a parent without affecting the legal relationship between the child and existing parent. 200 As of April 2012, sixteen states and the District of Columbia allow adoption by same-sex couples through joint or second-parent adoptions. 202 Some states have passed statutes to expressly permit such adoption, often abrogating prior decisions. 203 In other states, appellate decisions interpreting opaque state statutes allow adoption by same-sex couples. 204 In ten additional states, trial courts have granted second-parent adoptions to a non-birth partner. 205 At least seven states have laws limiting or prohibiting adoption by homosexual individuals. 206 Where families have challenged state laws restricting adoption based on the Federal Constitution, federal courts have expressed doubt as to whether a fundamental right to adopt or be adopted exists. 207 208. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817-27 (upholding the constitutionality of the Florida statute and concluding that the legislature -could have reasonably believed that prohibiting adoption into homosexual environments would further its interest in placing adoptive children in homes that will provide them with optimal developmental conditions‖). 
The Adoption Decree, -Incidental‖ Rights of Parent and Child, and Birth
Certificate Amendment Statutes
The judicial sanction of adoption creates a legal relationship of parent and child that entails legally enforceable obligations. 212 Generally, the adopter promises to support the child, relieves the biological parent of his or her rights and obligations, and gains full and exclusive parental rights over the child. 213 Most state statutes provide that after an adoption, the child is treated as if she were the adopter's biological offspring. 214 Absent -fraud or some other fundamental irregularity,‖ an adoption decree is final and irrevocable. 215 For these reasons, most scholars agree that an adoption judgment is entitled to full faith and credit in subsequent litigation. 216 In addition to a change in legal status, the child usually gains inheritance and property rights as provided by the state of the adoption. 217 These -incidents‖ 218 of adoption-including an adoptee's right to her adoptive parent's name or her right to recover damages for the wrongful death of an adoptive parent-vary from state to state. 219 For example, in recognition of the new legal identity acquired by an adopted child, every state has a statute providing for the reissuance of a birth certificate following the out-of-state adoption of a child born instate. 220 As suggested by the UAA, these statutes generally entitle a family to a new birth certificate including the name of the adoptive parents upon 212. See 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 1.01 [1] ; Presser, supra note 157, at 445 (distinguishing pre-1851 private contractual practice from modern legal adoption in that an adopted child could -expect no assistance from the law in enforcing any obligations which his adopting parents might have toward him‖).
213. 225 Almost all states use gender-neutral and sexuality-neutral language by providing that the names of adoptive -person‖ or -parents‖ may be substituted. 226 Nevertheless, in states where only married couples or single individuals can adopt, 227 and same-sex couples cannot legally marry, 228 out-of-state adoptive families involving same-sex couples have had difficulty in obtaining new birth certificates. 229 Courts and scholars dispute whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause governs the incidents of adoption. One approach asserts that the incidental rights of adoption fall within an enforcement framework and are therefore outside the exacting full faith and credit owed to judgments. 230 Another approach asserts that an adoption's incidental rights fall within the Clause's mandate of evenhanded enforcement. 231 At least one court has declined to apply full faith and credit analysis to the issuance of revised birth certificates.
In 400 (2011) (concluding that while Louisiana must recognize under the Clause the preclusive effect of a sister-state adoption judgment granted to a same-sex couple, the Louisiana statute providing for the reissuance of the adopted child's birth certificate was governed by Louisiana law and, therefore, permitted the exclusion of the couple); Wardle, supra note 109, at 597-99, 616 (concluding that the Clause -does not compel states with strong public policies against lesbigay adoption . . . to recognize or enforce lesbigay adoption decrees from other states that would effectively require the second state to legitimate lesbigay adoption and its incidents within its territory‖).
231. See Wasserman, supra note 107, at 82 (arguing that -just as states must recognize sister-state adoptions regardless of public policy objections, they must afford sister-state adoptions the same incidents they afford to local adoptions‖).
232. Davenport, 611 S.E.2d at 370-72; see VA. CODE ANN. § 32. 1-261 (2003) .
-father‖ supported a restrictive reading of the adoption provision. 233 In addition, Virginia contended that the state restriction of adoption to single individuals or to married couples sustained its interpretation. 234 The Virginia Supreme Court concluded that a plain reading of the statute invalidated the state's arguments. 235 The court declined to address the plaintiffs' full faith and credit claims, concluding, - The statute was a part of the -profound revolution in federalism‖ 241 that -alter[ed] the relationship between the States and the Nation.‖ 242 Section 1983 focuses on vigilante state officers who abused their -badge of authority‖ to deprive victims of protected rights. 243 The -very purpose‖ of § 1983 was -to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians‖ of constitutional rights, and to protect individuals from unconstitutional state action, -‗whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.'‖ 244 Recognizing the -paramount role Congress has assigned to the federal courts to protect constitutional rights,‖ there is no requirement of exhaustion of state judicial remedies under § 1983. 245 Although it -lay virtually dormant‖ from the 1890s to the 1940s, 246 § 1983 is now a -sword‖ 247 and the primary vehicle for vindicating constitutional rights against violations by state actors. 248 The Supreme Court has reiterated that the scope of the statute must be broadly and liberally construed. 249 Both the expansive statutory language 250 and the emphatic legislative history 251 mandate this approach. Accordingly, the Court has -rejected attempts to limit the types of constitutional rights that are encompassed within the Second, the Court inquired whether the -right‖ asserted was so -vague and amorphous‖ to be -beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.‖ 259 Third, the Court determined whether the constitutional provision was -intended to benefit‖ the putative plaintiff. 260 Acknowledging that the Commerce Clause's text addressed only Congress, the Court concluded that the long-established understanding of the Commerce Clause as a limit to states' regulatory power supported its enforcement against states. 261 Describing the Commerce Clause as a -selfexecuting limitation‖ on state power, 262 the Supreme Court concluded that Congress intended its protection to benefit individuals engaged in interstate commerce. 263 Focusing on the third consideration, the Court invoked its own -repeated references to ‗rights'‖ under the Commerce Clause as support for this conclusion. 264 In so holding, the Supreme Court rejected the defendants' three arguments that the Commerce Clause's protection was not a -right‖ for purposes of § 1983 because: first, the clause was only a power-allocating, rather than a right-conferring provision; 265 second, the clause was designed to promote national economic and political union, rather than benefit 266 and third, the clause was subject to qualification or elimination by Congress. 267 The Supreme Court recently limited Dennis's holding by stating that the doctrine of comity required individuals asserting state violations of the Commerce Clause to proceed first in state court, rather than filing directly in federal court. 268 The Court explained that the federal-state incarnation of comity -serves to ensure that ‗the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.'‖ 269
II. THE CONFLICT OVER RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF OUT-OF-STATE ADOPTION DECREES: WHOSE DUTY IS IT AND WHAT IS -EVENHANDED‖?
Part II of this Note details the conflict between U.S. Courts of Appeals over a state's obligation to reissue birth certificates to out-of-state adoptive parents. Courts differ over whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause contains an enforceable obligation of recognition for various state actors, or a guiding rule for state courts faced with a law or judgment conflicting with the state's own law. In addition, courts are split as to whether issuing a revised birth certificate falls within the Clause's provision for stringent recognition of sister-state adoptions. In the following sections, this Note examines the two approaches to each of these issues.
A. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
In Finstuen v. Crutcher, 270 the Tenth Circuit held that an Oklahoma policy of refusing revised birth certificates to out-of-state same-sex adoptive parents violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 271 The Finstuen plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of an amendment to Oklahoma's adoption code that prohibited any recognition of out-of-state adoptions by same-sex couples. 272 Oklahoma residents Lucy and Jennifer Doel adopted 266. Id. at 449. 267. Id. at 450. The Court dismissed this argument as -too much,‖ observing that Congress could similarly alter or eliminate federal statutory rights. Id. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the dissent, elaborated on the defendants' first two arguments, stating that the Framers intended the Commerce Clause as a -structural provision‖ to -preserve economic union and to suppress interstate rivalry.‖ Id. at 453 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that -[a]t best,‖ the Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause granted an individual the -right to have a judicial determination‖ nullifying the state tax that had violated the Commerce Clause. 273 Upon the Doels' return to Oklahoma, the Oklahoma State Department of Health (OSDH) refused to issue a revised birth certificate listing both parents, and instead issued a certificate that named only Lucy Doel as E's mother. 274 In 2004, the Oklahoma Attorney General issued an opinion stating that the Full Faith and Credit Clause required the OSDH to issue revised birth certificates reflecting the parental relationship in the adoption judgment, irrespective of whether the parents were eligible to adopt in Oklahoma. 275 In response, the Oklahoma legislature amended its adoption code to prohibit any state agency or court from recognizing a sister-state adoption by two individuals of the same sex. 276 The Doels then renewed their request, and were again denied a new birth certificate for E that included both mothers' names. 277 The Doels filed suit in federal court against three state executive officials: the OSDH Commissioner, the Governor, and the Attorney General. 278 The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause, as well as impairment of their constitutional right to travel. 279 Explaining their injury, the Doels recounted an incident when E had to be taken to the emergency room in an ambulance, and both the ambulance crew and emergency room personnel stated that only -E's mother‖ could accompany her. 280 The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the full faith and credit, equal protection, and due process claims, and ordered that the Commissioner issue a new birth certificate listing both parents' names. 281 Only the OSDH Commissioner, Dr. Michael Crutchen, appealed. 282 The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the Commissioner's conduct in enforcing the amendment violated the state's obligation under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize a sister-state's judgment. 283 1 Addressing the merits of Finstuen, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the unamended Oklahoma adoption statute must be applied to all judgments of adoption, regardless of whether they were held by out-of-state couples that could not adopt under Oklahoma law. 290 First, the court identified -a clear legislative expression of Oklahoma's public policy contrary to adoptions by same sex couples.‖ 291 However, quoting the Supreme Court's declaration in Baker v. General Motor Corp. that there is -no roving ‗public policy exception' to the full faith and credit due judgments,‖ 292 the Tenth Circuit held that Oklahoma was obligated to recognize the Doels' California adoption decree. 293 In doing so, the court confirmed that adoption decrees were final judgments and, therefore, were entitled to the -unequivocal‖ mandate of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 294 The court emphasized that its ruling was not allowing California -control over the effect of its judgment‖ in Oklahoma. 298 Instead, the Tenth Circuit stated that it was requiring that state executive officials apply Oklahoma law in an -‗evenhanded manner.'‖ 299 Therefore, Oklahoma's amended statute violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause because it categorically denied the -effective operation‖ of a class of out-ofstate adoption decrees. 300
B. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
In contrast with the Tenth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit held that out-of-state unmarried adoptive couples were not entitled to amended birth certificates under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 301 In Adar v. Smith, a couple brought suit against the Louisiana Registrar after she refused to issue a revised birth certificate for the couple's adopted child. 302 Mickey Smith and Oren Adar were an unmarried, same-sex couple who adopted Louisiana-born -J‖ in New York in 2006. 303 In the adoption proceedings, Smith and Adar also changed J's name from the one appearing on his original birth certificate. 304 The couple then sought to have J's Louisiana birth certificate reissued with both fathers' names supplanting those of J's biological parents. 305 At 308 In a letter denying the couple's request, 309 the Registrar posited that section 40 applied only to adoption decrees possessed by married parents. 310 She reasoned that section 40's term -adoptive parents‖ 311 meant only married parents because, pursuant to a separate statute, Louisiana allowed only a -husband and wife‖ to jointly adopt a child. 312 The Registrar also relied on an Attorney General advisory opinion, 313 which concluded that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not require Louisiana to recognize out-of-state adoption judgments that violated Louisiana's -strong public policy‖ against both adoption by unmarried individuals and same-sex marriage. 314 The family sued the Louisiana Registrar under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that her actions violated Adar, Smith, and J's rights under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. 315 As to injury, the family alleged that its inability to obtain an accurate birth certificate had caused problems related to obtaining medical insurance for J through Adar or Smith's employer. 316 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the Full Faith and Credit Clause claim, ruling that the Clause required the defendants to recognize the out-of-state adoption judgment. 317 A Fifth Circuit panel affirmed the district court in 2010, holding that final adoption decrees were entitled to exacting credit. 318 The panel also dismissed the Registrar's interpretation of section 40 as defying the When a person born in Louisiana is adopted in a court of proper jurisdiction in any other state or territory of the United States, the state registrar may create a new record of birth in the archives upon presentation of a properly certified copy of the final decree of adoption . . . . Upon receipt of the certified copy of the decree, the state registrar shall make a new record in its archives, showing . . . [t] statute's unambiguous meaning. 319 Finally, the Fifth Circuit panel emphasized that it was Louisiana's own statute that directed the Registrar to reissue birth certificates, while the Full Faith and Credit Clause required that section 40 be applied in an -evenhanded‖ manner. 320 A few months later, the Fifth Circuit ordered a rehearing en banc. 321 The en banc majority, in an opinion authored by Chief Judge Edith H. Jones, reversed the district court and held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not govern the actions of a state executive official, 322 and, even if it did, the Registrar's refusal was not unconstitutional because issuing a birth certificate was beyond the recognition required by the Clause. 323 A keenly worded dissent 324 In Adar, the Fifth Circuit majority concluded that the Full Faith and Credit Clause governed only state courts and not any other state actors. 326 According to the en banc majority, the Full Faith and Credit Clause introduced only a -rule of decision‖ to guide courts--[n]o more, no less.‖ 327 The court explained that the Clause governed only the res judicata effect of a judgment, 328 which arose only when litigation was pursued in another state or federal court. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Full Faith and Credit Clause was a rule for state courts, rather than an obligation imposed on all state actors generally. 329 Since the full faith and credit command fell only on courts, the Adar majority declared that -it is incoherent to speak of vindicating full faith and credit rights against non-judicial state actors.‖ 330 The Fifth Circuit majority acknowledged that the Supreme Court -ha [d] at times referred to the clause in terms of individual ‗rights,'‖ but asserted that the Court -consistently identifie[d] the violators of that right as state courts.‖ 331 The court therefore ruled that the § 1983 cause of action could not be sustained against state executive officials to enforce full faith and credit for out-ofstate adoption decrees. 332 In so holding, the en banc majority concluded that Adar, Smith, and J should have sought to compel the issuance of a revised birth certificate in Louisiana state court, rather than through a federal cause of action. 333 Under the majority's construction, only a state court's denial of the parents' request would implicate the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and even then only upon Supreme Court review of state court decisions. 334 Observing in a footnote that the Full Faith and Credit Clause addressed itself to -each state,‖ not to -each state's court,‖ the en banc majority acknowledged that one might consider its interpretation -curious.‖ 335 The Fifth Circuit majority then ruled in the alternative that, even if the Full Faith and Credit Clause did govern the actions of a state official, the Louisiana Registrar did not deny recognition to the New York adoption decree when she declined to reissue a new birth certificate for J. 343 The court distinguished between recognizing the existence of the parental relationship-which the Registrar did, and was obligated to do under the Clause-and reissuing the birth certificate, a separate act of enforcement. 344 According to the majority, issuing a revised birth certificate fell in the -heartland of enforcement‖ and was therefore beyond the mandate of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 345 The court cited the Supreme Court for the proposition that the Clause -does not compel ‗a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.'‖ 346 Thus, the Fifth Circuit explained, outside of the res judicata effect required by the Clause, Louisiana was the -sole mistress‖ of directing the rights created by out-ofstate adoption decrees. 347 In so holding, the en banc majority reasoned that a new birth certificate was an -incidental benefit[]‖ to adoption, rather than a right created by the couple's New York adoption. 348 Finally, the Fifth Circuit ruled that Louisiana had fulfilled its obligation under Baker to apply its laws concerning the -enforcement‖ of out-of-state judgments in an -evenhanded‖ way. 349 The en banc majority stated that because Louisiana did not permit any unmarried couples to obtain revised birth certificates, the state was under no obligation to issue one to Adar 356 This Note argues that the federal, state, and individual interests in finality and unity outweigh a state's policy preferences. This Note therefore asserts that states must give meaningful recognition to out-of-state adoption decrees pursuant to the Clause, even when such judgments are contrary to the state's own policy.
Part III.A addresses the potential misapplication of the division between enforcement and recognition, arguing that states may not apply the distinction to undermine the substantive rights created by judgments. Part III.B asserts that, in addition to balancing state and federal power, the Clause confers an individual right to recognition of sister-state judgments that is vindicable under § 1983 when refused by a state official.
A. Clarifying the Distinction Between Recognition and Enforcement
Although the Supreme Court has articulated a distinction between a judgment's recognition and enforcement for purposes of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 357 states may not reframe this distinction to escape their constitutional obligation. It is well established that states must recognize out-of-state judgments and may apply their own enforcement measures. 358 To comply with the Clause, however, states also must apply their enforcement mechanisms in an -evenhanded manner.‖ 359 Thus, both recognition and enforcement fall under the Full Faith and Credit Clause's command.
Although the distinction allows for local variance in enforcement measures, 360 it does not constitute a de facto public policy exception to a state's constitutional obligation. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that there is -no roving ‗public policy exception'‖ to the credit owed to 352 363 Instead, the Clause requires uniform respect for the integrity and finality of sister-state judgments. 364 The finality of sister-state adoption decrees includes the legal status of parent and child. 365 The Supreme Court has long established that recognition under the Full Faith and Credit Clause speaks not only to the facial -validity‖ of a judgment, but also its substance or -effect.‖ 366 The effect of the judicial sanction of adoption is a legal relationship of parent and child. 367 A state's refusal to recognize a legally created status as adoptive parent or child violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause's stringent command regarding judgments.
Even if the issuance of a revised birth certificate is termed -enforcement‖ of -incidental rights‖ of adoption, 368 states should not be able to manipulate their enforcement provisions to avoid their Full Faith and Credit Clause obligation to recognize sister-state judgments. 369 The Supreme Court's mandate that a state apply its enforcement mechanisms in an -evenhanded manner‖ prohibits that state from undermining or undoing the substantive rights created by a judgment. 370 In the context of judgments, the Clause's command orders -submission by one State even to hostile policies reflected in the judgment of another State.‖ 371 Thus, the federal, state, and individual interests underlying the Clause's strict command for judgments outweigh a single state's interest in asserting its own policy, in the context of judgments. 372 Interpreting a statute that refers only to -adoptive parents‖ to exclude same-sex couples based on separate statutory provisions improperly incorporates public policy into a state's recognition of sister-state judgments. 373 Where an in-state statute provides for in-state operation of out-of-state adoption decrees, a state registrar should not be free to discriminate based on any disagreement with another state's policy that gave rise to the judgment. 374 This discrimination against other states' policies is precisely what the Framers sought to end with the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 375 This limit on state sovereignty is a -price‖ of a federal system. 376 Furthermore, a state executive official's interpretation of statutory language to withhold recognition or enforcement undermines the separation of powers principle underlying the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 377 By substituting her own interpretation for that of the state legislature, so as to undermine the validity and integrity of a sister-state judgment, a state official infringes on the authority of both the judiciary and legislature to determine state policies. 378 Therefore, the distinction between enforcement and recognition does not render the Clause powerless to a state's application of its own enforcement mechanisms to an out-of-state judgment.
B. A State's Binding Obligation Under the Clause Confers an Individual Right to Equal Recognition that Is Vindicable Under § 1983
While the Supreme Court has never stated that § 1983 can be used for Full Faith and Credit Clause violations, its application of § 1983 to the Commerce Clause indicates that the Court may be willing to recognize its use in Full Faith and Credit Clause cases because both clauses serve to unify states by limiting state authority. Indeed, the Supreme Court has equated the Clause's -unifying force‖ to that of the Commerce Clause. 379 The Full Faith and Credit Clause's history and text, as well as the Supreme Court precedent that has given meaning to its command, support the conclusion that by prohibiting state discrimination against out-of-state judgments held by individuals, the Clause confers correlative, enforceable rights on individuals.
Moreover, the Court has reiterated that § 1983 must be broadly, liberally, and beneficently construed to ensure federal protection of constitutional rights. 380 Permitting a § 1983 cause of action for violations of the Clause is consistent with the purpose of § 1983-to -interpose‖ the federal courts to guard against state officers who, under the badge of state authority, deprive individuals of constitutionally granted rights. 381 It is therefore reasonable to conclude that when a state official evades his constitutional obligation to recognize rights created by a sister-state's judgment, such as the parentchild relationship created by adoption, the holder of those rights is entitled to bring suit in federal court. 383 the Clause is a self-executing limitation on state power. 384 The Framers intended the Clause to transform the states from -independent foreign sovereigns, each free to ignore‖ out-of-state judgments, to integral parts welded together through federal obligations. 385 The Full Faith and Credit Clause eliminated a state's discretion to disregard the judgments of sisterstates based on its own policy preferences. 386 The Supreme Court's previous treatment of the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not control the question of whether the Clause reaches state officials. The cases in which the Court stated that the Clause only prescribes a -rule by which courts . . . are to be guided . . . in the progress of a pending suit‖ 387 do not limit the Clause's mandate to only state courts. 388 In 1904's Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 389 the Supreme Court's explanation came in response to the state's assertion of a Full Faith and Credit Clause violation in an attempt to remove its state law case to federal court. 390 Since Minnesota asserted that a private corporation avoided recognition of Minnesota's own antitrust laws, 391 it is reasonable to conclude that the statement referred to the Clause's function in a court's choice-of-law analysis. 392 In this context, the Clause serves as a guiding rule, alongside a forum state's public policy considerations, in determining the application of sister-state laws. 393 In addition, the Court's declaration that the Clause had -nothing to do with the conduct of individuals or corporations‖ 394 is correctly understood as dismissing the state's contention that a private entity also had full faith and credit duties under the Clause's -in each state‖ language, rather than excluding individuals as beneficiaries of the Clause.
Though in 1988's Thompson v. Thompson, 395 the Supreme Court echoed Northern Securities's -guiding rule‖ language, it responded to a plaintiff's attempt to appeal to federal courts to determine the validity of two competing state custody determinations. 396 This is distinct from a claim alleging a state official's affirmative denial of full faith and credit. Thompson is not controlling because it addressed only a private claim brought against another private individual. 397 Therefore, there is no controlling Supreme Court statement as to the Full Faith and Credit Clause's reach. Accordingly, the Clause's plain language should control, which binds state executive officials and state courts. Although typically invoked by litigants after a state court has refused to accord preclusive effect to the substance of a sister-state's judgment, 398 the Clause unambiguously addresses -states.‖ 399 
The Right to Meaningful Recognition of Adoption Is Sufficiently Specific for Federal Courts to Enforce
For litigants holding judicially created rights, the Full Faith and Credit Clause guarantees a right that is sufficiently specific for federal courts to enforce under § 1983. In contrast to the accommodating rule applied to sister-state statutes, 400 the Clause's -exacting obligation‖ for sister-state judgments defines a clear right to nationwide recognition. 401 Whereas the credit due to statutory law is subject to a somewhat vague public policy exception, 402 the credit due to judicial rights is governed by an -iron‖ full faith and credit requirement that bars exceptions. 403 The judicial sanction of adoption bestows a legal status determination of parent or child, and entitles the individuals who are party to an adoption to nationwide recognition and respect of that status. 404 The Full Faith and Credit Clause secures recognition not only of the evidentiary validity of a judgment, but its substance or -effect.‖ 405 The legal status of parent and child is therefore specific enough to merit enforcement.
The Framers Intended the Clause to Benefit Litigants by Ensuring Finality and Certainty
The history and purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause indicate that the Framers intended the Clause to benefit individuals whose rights, statuses, and obligations were created by judgments. By deliberately imposing a binding obligation on states, 406 the Framers protected litigants from the -accordion-like‖ predilections of states presented with sister-state judgments. 407 The Clause not only guarantees that judicially confirmed rights are preserved as litigants travel among states, but also advances the -maximum enforcement‖ of those rights. 408 Moreover, as the Supreme Court explained regarding the Commerce Clause in Dennis v. Higgins, 409 the Full Faith and Credit Clause addresses itself to states and textually balances power among states and between the federal and state governments 410 is not prohibitive to determining that the provision also confers corresponding individual rights. 411 Indeed, all the defendants' unavailing arguments in Dennis regarding the Commerce Clause similarly fail when applied to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Though the Full Faith and Credit Clause is a power-allocating provision, it is also a substantive limitation on a state's treatment of out-of-state judgments. 412 While the Framers designed the Clause to promote national unity, they also intended the full faith and credit mandate to benefit individuals who held -obligations created . . . by the judicial proceedings‖ of other states. 413 Finally, though the Full Faith and Credit Clause is arguably subject to qualification by Congress pursuant to the Effects Clause, 414 both the Full Faith and Credit Clause and Full Faith and Credit Act currently secure the maximum recognition of sister-state judgments. 415 
CONCLUSION
The Full Faith and Credit Clause is a meaningful imperative for states to respect sister-state judgments. Where one state has an interest in generating its own distinctive judgments, and another has an interest in asserting its own statutory policies, the Clause at times requires that a state's local policy give way to the overriding combination of federal, state, and individual interests. Federalism and finality outweigh a single state's interest in its own policies.
Even so, to balance these competing interests, the Supreme Court has distinguished between a state's obligation of recognition and enforcement pursuant to the Clause. Under both standards, however, the Clause prohibits states from undermining the substantive rights and obligations sanctioned by a judgment. A state cannot undo substantive recognition by reframing the application of its enforcement measures. The framework of meaningful recognition best summarizes the Full Faith and Credit Clause's command. Meaningful recognition allows for the maximum enforcement of judicially created rights within the Clause's careful balance of interests.
